Jan.31

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Setec Astronomy, Part I

Is the reference in the headline recognizable anymore? If not, it's from a key scene in the 1992 movie Sneakers, wherein the characters realize the mysterious phrase "Setec Astronomy" descrambles to "too many secrets." If you haven't seen the film, you should really consider it; even if it's three decades old, it's a great popcorn movie with a stellar cast (Robert Redford, Sidney Poitier, Dan Aykroyd, David Strathairn, Ben Kingsley, River Phoenix, etc.). And yes, we know that Setec Astronomy is also referenced in Ready Player One.

We bring this up as entree to our ongoing discussion of classified documents. It would seem that we are not the only ones who think that maybe the federal government has too many secrets. Or, perhaps more precisely, too many things being treated as secrets that really don't need to be. There was an effort during the George W. Bush administration to cut back on overclassification that went nowhere. Now, there is some momentum in that direction once again. It's too early to say if anything will come of it, but at least people are talking. Of course, people also talk after mass shootings, and look how much that's accomplished (Hint: zero).

Last week, we asked for readers with expertise greater than ours to weigh in on the subject, and we were not disappointed. We're going to run some of the interesting responses here, and we'll run some more tomorrow:

• S.K. in Atlanta, GA: I was flooded with memories when you opined on the possibility that there's simply too much classified information. In my 4 years' experience in Navy Intelligence, that is an accurate assessment, especially at the Secret level. The vast majority of the work we did was at that level (much less was Top Secret or Classified) and was platformed on a network called SIPR. The problem lies in the fact that anything that touches SIPR instantly became classified Secret due to guilt by association for having been on the SIPR network. This makes sense given the fact that you wouldn't want data or programs removed from SIPR to the unclassified side of things that potentially now contain Secret material.
  
  That groundwork being laid, readers may be shocked to learn what sorts of things end up on SIPR and are thus considered Secret material. Some of this was a bit understandable; e.g. I had a report about cruise ship activity in the Mediterranean as part of an exercise and used some screenshots from Royal Caribbean. Alas, since it was on SIPR, those screenshots of a public website were now classified Secret and subject to all the rules and laws regarding handling Secret material. What gets more interesting is the amount of personal and, shall we say, extra-personal, things that Sailors and Marines end up storing on SIPR for easy access. A stash of digital pornography was a common find on SIPR. If the uploading service member was identified, they would be subject to moderate punishment, however that doesn't change the fact that the Navy now has a stash of officially Secret pornography.
  
  All that to say, there is a ton of technically Secret material that the public would be amazed at—photos from a command picnic, Wikipedia articles, yo-mama jokes, credit card statements, and on and on.
  
  
• C.L. in Concord, NH: In your quest to be enlightened about security around classified documents, I'm happy to share my experience. I work for a large U.S. government DoD contractor supporting the Air Force and hold an active clearance. One of the annual trainings that we have to take like clockwork involves handling classified information, and the common theme in that training is "if you cause a breach, it's a serious offense and you could go to jail... blah blah blah." However, there is very little actual physical security involving these documents. If someone really wanted to stuff a classified document in their briefcase, unless someone watched them do so, there are no security guards on the way out searching said briefcase. I never thought I'd agree with Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), but I would absolutely say that there's a process issue here and the government needs to revamp how they deal with this, because it's a scary thought that if it took years for former VPs to find documents at their residences. Imagine what the damage a random person could do with defense secrets.
  
  
• M.M. in Leonardtown, MD: I'm an agency civilian and military reservist. This is what I've seen re: classification:
  
  
  • Too much is classified. As you wrote, the tendency to err on the side of caution has led to classification of items that do not need to be. Additionally, declassification requires a review to determine if the material no longer requires protection. This leads to a vicious cycle where more and more becomes classified just due to volume and inertia.
    
    
  • Too many people have clearances and/or classification authority. A consequence of so much being classified is that many more people "need" a clearance just to do their jobs. If the classification process was more stringent (both on what is classified and who can make the determination), fewer people would require clearances.
    
    
  • Actual access to information is too easy. With so many people and so much information, it's very easy for people to become inured to the handling of classified information. More release of classified information is due to accidental mishandling (misplacing a flash drive, using non-classified hardware to access classified data, etc.) than malicious actions.
    
    
  • Disproportionate punishment for breaches. I understand that the DoJ has limited resources and must prioritize criminal investigations/trials. However, punishing only low-level employees and officials for breaches is a bad look when trying to stress the importance of information security.
  
  I'll leave the notion of solutions to others, not least because potential options are likely to be expensive and unpopular.
  
  
• J.G. in Chantilly, VA: I've held a security clearance for most of my adult life, having served in a foreign affairs agency as an employee or contractor. The dirty secret is that proper document security depends heavily upon the conscientiousness and personal organizational habits of the user. Classified documents are not sacred scrolls or even library books. They are generated electronically with multiple hard and soft copies distributed to several agencies and persons. At the staff level (anything below Cabinet), most people are careful to avoid incurring a security violation. Security or Marine guards circulate after hours and inspect work spaces. Even so, errors happen and security violations are issued. But the most senior officials deal with a lot of very sensitive documents and issues, and do so around the clock. I am fairly certain that nearly every former president, veep, or foreign affairs Cabinet official has at one time or another accidentally mixed classified documents with other papers. Allegedly, Jimmy Carter mixed up the nuclear codes in his dry cleaning. Stuff happens. I also suspect a few have done so intentionally, though not as egregiously as Trump did.
  
  The chronic problem of overclassification will not go away, but I think it's separate from the real problem of getting the most senior officials of the government to act more carefully. Overclassification usually affects working documents that agencies want to restrict, not the kinds of documents or issues that concern the White House or the NSC, which really do need to be classified. I do not see any easy solution or system to prevent mishandling of lower-level classifieds by senior officials, and I'm not terribly worried about it, since that kind of information usually goes stale after a few months (or is reported in the press anyway). On the other hand, the highest level information, (e.g., at the TS/SCIF or similar levels), needs better control because leaks can be truly damaging, and can even get people killed. One solution is to have cleared staff regularly sweep the personal files of their bosses, especially before and after a transition. But again, that depends upon the cooperation of the official. If you have someone with a very large ego and an aggressive personality, they will likely resist any inspections and their underlings will dare not cross them.
  
  In any case, there is a big difference between mishandling classified documents, versus willfully stealing them, or refusing to return them once stolen. The first is a security violation (leading to a warning), the latter is a crime.
  
  
• B.J.L. in Ann Arbor, MI: I was classified with a security clearance in the 80s for an industrial contractor building missiles and other avionics electronics. I was glad I wasn't more classified than I was. I understood the rationale for classification, but the whole effort for classifying people was over the top. We had annual meetings with g-men with our passports to describe our vacations/travel. Leaving anything out was grounds for automatic termination. My friends with higher classifications received clicker phones where they had to engage the microphone to talk; no putting the phone down and hearing an errant conversation. Their offices were also sequestered to avoid any potential classified materials release. I have a grand total of one photograph of my years at the operation. Maybe things are more relaxed now given smartphone proliferation, but back then, it was definitely Big Brother. It seems that at the lowest end of the spectrum, there are hard rules—mess up anywhere and it's curtains. But if you make it to the point that processing classified stuff is a day by day thing, maybe people get numb to both using it and tracking it. If Mike Pence or Joe Biden had worked next to me while I was there, they would not be so careless.

Thanks, all! And, as noted, we'll have another batch tomorrow. (Z)