Jan.06

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GOP 53

Don't Cry for Me, Venezuela

The Trump administration's assault on Venezuela, and arrest of president Nicolás Maduro and his wife, continues to dominate the headlines. Let's do a rundown of the dozen most notable storylines, in our view:

1. China: Pretty much everyone is sure that China is a big part of the Venezuela story, but there is no agreement on exactly what the China angle is. One popular line of thinking is that now that the U.S. has set a (modern) precedent for invading a smaller country, grabbing the leader, and taking over, that will eventually lay the groundwork for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. There is much chatter on Chinese social media right now that makes this exact point.
   
   With the usual caveat that foreign affairs is not really our bailiwick, we are somewhat skeptical. "China's about to make its move on Taiwan" is the international version of "Texas is about to turn blue." It's been prophesied for decades, yet never comes to pass. Keep in mind that no matter how wild and woolly U.S. foreign policy gets, there are many other nations that would be very unhappy about a Taiwan takeover, among them Japan, South Korea, and the member states of the E.U. That will surely give Xi Jinping pause, just as it's given him pause for the last 13 years (he took power in 2013).
   
   A second notion that is currently in wide circulation is that whether or not this attack affords the Chinese an opportunity to grab Taiwan, it reflects a shift in focus on the part of the U.S. government, away from the Eastern Hemisphere, and toward the Western Hemisphere. That, in theory, will allow Xi & Co. the opportunity to maneuver under a slightly (or substantially) less watchful American eye.
   
   We share this argument, because it's definitely out there, but we don't actually buy it. The Trump administration claims it can do two things at once, and can keep an eye on China while also mucking around in Latin America. We don't generally believe the claims made by Trump & Co., but we tend to believe them here, if only because the U.S. military establishment is very competent (even if its current leader is a preening moron), and has been acting as "world police" for generations. Further, there is zero chance that the next Democratic president says "Well, guess American foreign policy is Latin-America-focused now." They are going to perform a reset. That might also be true of the next Republican president. So, at most, China gets a few years of reduced scrutiny. And remember, even if the U.S. becomes distracted, Japan, South Korea and the E.U. are still watching closely.
   
   The third idea that is floating around is that the attack on Venezuela, far from being good news for the Chinese, was a shot across Xi's bow, and a warning that he better keep his nose clean. One of the last things that Maduro did before being grabbed was meet with Chinese diplomats, and quite a few people don't think it's a coincidence that the U.S. made its move just hours later.
   
   We would guess this is the most correct of the three theories listed here. At very least, Xi has been given a clear message not to mess around in Latin America. At most, the lesson for him is "There's an unpredictable warmonger in the White House, and who knows what he might do next?" The Chinese government is famously cautious and willing to play the long game. They are likely to sit back and observe for a very long time, perhaps the rest of Trump's term. It is therefore plausible that, at least in this way, the current administration's bull-in-a-china-shop foreign policy managed to secure the same result as the much more sophisticated Sino-American realpolitik of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.
   
   
2. Who's Next?: Given all the loose talk over the weekend, the slight majority view seems to be that this is not going to stop with Venezuela, and that eventually the administration will go after some other country. We think that is more likely than not, and given the various bugaboos of the hawkish wing of the GOP, we would put our money on Cuba as the most probable target.
   
   However, thus far, none of the futures markets is taking bets on invasion of Cuba (or Colombia, for that matter). On the other hand, bettors on Kalshi currently put it at 36% that the Trump administration will grab at least part of Greenland. That is the highest that number has been since the week or so that Trump was obsessing about Greenland in February of last year. Alternatively, if you're interested in a dark horse, the Kalshi bettors see a 38% chance that Trump will reclaim ownership of the Panama Canal.
   
   We suppose that you could argue that going after the Panama Canal is sort of like an attack on Colombia, since Panama was part of Colombia until, well, the U.S. arranged for it NOT to be a part of Colombia anymore. Meanwhile, Colombian President Gustavo Petro released a video yesterday taunting Trump: "I'm waiting for you here. Don't threaten me, I'll wait for you right here if you want to." We have no doubt that many Colombians appreciate such a bold, macho attitude. Time will tell if Petro comes to regret poking Trump in the eye, in pretty much the exact same way that Maduro did.
   
   
3. Marco Rubio: Secretary of State Marco Rubio has now claimed, several times, that it was just not possible to advise Congress' "Gang of Eight" as to the administration's plans, even though that is required by law, because of the risk that something might leak out. When we wrote our first item about the invasion of Venezuela, we noted this is an obvious lie. Remember, Congress gives broad approval/advice when it comes to military operations, and does not get involved in specifics. Congress did not decide, for example, to fight a battle at Gettysburg, or to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, or to commence Operation Rolling Thunder during the Vietnam War. That means Rubio could certainly have consulted with the Gang of Eight (or the entire Congress, for that matter), to discuss operations against Venezuela in a broad sense. Leaks would not be an issue in this context, since everyone has known for months an invasion of Venezuela was likely.
   
   And, as it turns out, Rubio's lies are worse than it appeared at first glance. Not only did he fail to speak to the Gang of Eight or anyone else in Congress (and the White House STILL hasn't done so), but in his last meeting with Congress before the Christmas break, he assured the Gang of Eight that "the U.S. is not currently planning to launch strikes inside Venezuela and doesn't have a legal justification that would support attacks against any land targets." We now know that, when he said that, plans for an invasion of Venezuela had been in the works for at least several weeks, and likely more than that.
   
   There is virtually no chance that Rubio will pay any price for flouting the law AND for looking the members of Congress right in the face and lying to them. In fact, we would put the odds at 99.8% that he'll get away with it. The reason we leave that 0.2% on the table is that we can at least envision a scenario where Congress/the Senate decides that the White House needs to be reined in, but is unwilling to take Trump on directly, and so makes Rubio into a fall guy. It's at least possible, though keep in mind that a 0.2% chance works out to 1-in-500. That's very, very long odds. Of course, if the Democrats capture either chamber of Congress in November, that changes the picture.
   
   
4. Lindsey Graham: As long as we are on the subject of warmongers war hawks, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) hasn't been this happy since Ricky Martin announced he would be going back out on tour. At very least, Graham, who has spent his whole Senate career longing for an invasion of Cuba, has been thumping his chest and promising that invasion is now all-but-imminent, and that Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel will soon be forced from power.
   
   At most, Graham is the puppetmaster who is personally responsible for the Venezuela invasion. At least, this is the claim being made by Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), who is more than happy to share his views with any reporter who will listen. Paul is not always the world's most reliable narrator, but he IS a member of the Senate Republican Conference, and we don't see any reason to think he would spread outright falsehoods here.
   
   
5. Big Oil: Donald Trump does not understand... well, much of anything, to be honest. When it comes to Venezuela, he knows a couple of things: (1) Most of the United States' major petroleum firms used to be heavily invested in Venezuela and (2) since those firms left Venezuela (circa 2007), that nation's oil production has dropped precipitously, meaning there's a lot of untapped black gold in the ground. Those two things are facts. Trump is also persuaded that there is a near-unlimited demand for oil in America and worldwide, and all that is needed is more supply. This, by contrast, is NOT a fact.
   
   From these three notions, two of them correct, one not, Trump has clearly concluded that Venezuelan oil presents an unbelievable opportunity for Big Oil; all that they need is to regain the access they once enjoyed. It's a little weedy, but about 20 years ago, then-Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez semi-nationalized oil production. Under the terms he laid down, the American oil firms COULD have remained. But they all decided, sooner or later, that there was no further money to be made, and that they were better off abandoning Venezuela, even if that meant leaving a vast and valuable infrastructure of pipes and extraction equipment behind.
   
   One can understand how an ill-informed person like Trump could put the pieces together in the way he apparently has. However, the reality of the situation is rather less rosy than he thinks. Do you know what happens when heavy industrial infrastructure goes 20 years without proper maintenance? That's right, it deteriorates—badly. It is not possible for ExxonMobil, Chevron or Shell to just waltz in and flip a switch. In fact, people in the know believe that restoring the infrastructure will take multiple decades and will cost at least $100 billion. And some estimates put the total north of $150 billion. That's serious coin, even for big oil.
   
   Someone in the White House seems to have figured this out, and so there's already talk of heavy-duty corporate welfare, to "encourage" Big Oil to re-invest in Venezuela. But even that is not likely to make the balance sheets attractive to the various CEOs, for a number of reasons.
   
   The first of those is that, despite Trump's crude understanding of the oil business, the fact is that the worldwide supply is currently adequate. At the same time, due to the rise of electric vehicles and alternate energy sources, demand is declining. Big Oil is not eager to gamble on long-term projects right now. This is why the Trump administration has had very limited success in selling offshore drilling rights, which was Trump's PREVIOUS unbelievable opportunity for Big Oil.
   
   Beyond that, there are issues particular to Venezuela. It is not a stable country and has not been for a long time. And don't forget that its leaders already nationalized the oil industry once; they could certainly do so again whenever the U.S. government loses interest in nation-building. Meanwhile, the crude that is produced there is very difficult to process. Back in 2007, having abandoned Venezuela, most Big Oil firms shifted to Canadian oil sands, which produce crude that is much easier to work with. If the choice for the CEOs is (1) a stable nation, where the infrastructure is already paid off and operating correctly, and the product is easier to process, or (2) an unstable nation, where the infrastructure is many years and many, many billions of dollars from being viable, and the product is harder to process, well... is that really any choice at all?
   
   It is certainly possible that American firms, with their expertise and technology, can improve Venezuelan oil production around the margins. But the notion of a bold, new era in U.S.-Venezuela oil production is almost certainly a fantasy when so much better-quality oil is available in more stable places.
   
   
6. An Inside Job?: There are a lot of conspiracy theories floating around right now. The one that appears to be both the most popular, and the most reasonable, is that Maduro was betrayed by an insider. This, in theory, would explain: (1) why he was so easy to grab, and (2) why none of the other members of his leadership cabal were removed from the country, and so remain in power.
   
   The main person upon whom suspicion has fallen is Delcy Rodríguez, who appears to have been out of the country when Maduro was taken, and who has now been sworn in as Venezuela's acting president. We presume that, once enough time passes, the "acting" part of that will be dropped. In any case, Rodríguez was initially defiant, and demanded Maduro's return. Yesterday, however, she posted this message to social media:

   A message from Venezuela to the world, and to the United States:
   
   Venezuela reaffirms its commitment to peace and peaceful coexistence. Our country aspires to live without external threats, in an environment of respect and international cooperation. We believe that global peace is built by first guaranteeing peace within each nation.
   
   We prioritize moving towards balanced and respectful international relations between the United States and Venezuela, and between Venezuela and other countries in the region, premised on sovereign equality and non-interference. These principles guide our diplomacy with the rest of the world.
   
   We invite the US government to collaborate with us on an agenda of cooperation oriented towards shared development within the framework of international law to strengthen lasting community coexistence.
   
   President Donald Trump, our peoples and our region deserve peace and dialogue, not war. This has always been President Nicolás Maduro's message, and it is the message of all of Venezuela right now. This is the Venezuela I believe in and have dedicated my life to. I dream of a Venezuela where all good Venezuelans can come together.
   
   Venezuela has the right to peace, development, sovereignty and a future.
   
   Delcy Rodríguez
   Acting President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

   She certainly seems to be walking both sides of the street, which may be politically necessary to keep both Trump and the Venezuelan people at bay.
   
   
7. 18 Months: The White House has also made clearer what it means when it says that the U.S. will "run" Venezuela for now. Basically, the Department of Defense will park a bunch of big, scary ships off the coast of Venezuela, and as long as Rodríguez is a good soldier and takes her marching orders from Trump, the ships won't actually do anything. That sort of arrangement is known as a "puppet regime," kids. Under the right conditions, it works well. "President" Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus could explain that to Rodríguez if she needs advice on how that works.
   
   So, how long does the administration think it will be actively involved in "running" Venezuela? Yesterday, Trump said that the current plan is 18 months, because "it's going to take a period of time to bring Venezuela back to health."
   
   At this point, allow us to share a quote from a New York Times story published on Sept. 3, 2003: "One senior official said that Mr. Bush's national security team envisions withdrawing the majority of American forces now in Iraq within 18 months to 2 years..." (emphasis ours). For the record, the last troops were withdrawn from Iraq on December 18, 2011, after an occupation that lasted 8 years, 8 months and 28 days. Of course, that war involved getting rid of a corrupt dictator so as to gain access to oil, whereas this war... wait a minute...
   
   
8. Protest: If you could not guess that the protests have already begun, around the world, you haven't been paying attention (particularly to how most people worldwide respond to Trump). As far as we can tell, the good people of Albuquerque, NM, beat everyone else to the punch:
   
   
   
   That particular protest commenced about 12 hours after the news of the Venezuela attack broke. Not bad, inasmuch as the news went public in the middle of the night.
   
   
9. Polling: We are hardly surprised that there is already much protest against the U.S. invasion of Venezuela. That happens with every military conflict, even the ones that are broadly popular. In the piece we wrote over the weekend, we also supposed there would be no "rally 'round the flag" effect—a burst of pro-administration enthusiasm that counterbalances the burst of protest. It looks like we were right about that.
   
   There have now been at least two reliable polls of Americans' feelings about the invasion of Venezuela. The first is from The Washington Post/SSRS. According to their numbers, 40% of respondents approve of the invasion, 42% disapprove, and 18% have no opinion. The second is from Reuters/Ipsos. They have it at 33% approval, 34% disapproval, and 33% no opinion.
   
   These are pretty grim numbers for the White House. There's clearly no rallying around the flag. Further, it is almost universally the case that military conflicts get less and less popular the more time that passes. And if you examine the crosstabs of these two polls, you can see that this is likely where the Venezuela situation is headed. For example, the "approve" numbers are almost all Republicans, but even among that segment, it's only 2-to-1 in favor. It's not great for a president if even his base is not too far removed from being evenly divided. Further, and to take just one example, only 24% of the WaPo respondents support the U.S. taking control of Venezuela, while 45% oppose. In other words, as the U.S. commitment deepens, the whole thing becomes less popular. Similarly, 73% of the Reuters respondents are concerned about the risk that "the U.S. will become too involved in the situation in Venezuela."
   
   
10. America First!: We recognize that Trump really doesn't care about Americans who would dare protest his war, and, really, he doesn't care about anyone who is not MAGA. His whole approach has always been to get MAGA as fired up as is possible, and everyone else be damned. However, just as it's clear that a "rally 'round the flag" effect is unlikely, it's also clear that the invasion of Venezuela is not likely to fire up MAGA. In fact, if anything, it's likely to divide the base, since it's already doing so.
    
    Keep in mind that, during his three election campaigns, Trump pretended to be a populist. And one of the core elements of populism is isolationism. The general idea is "We working-class people have problems that need to be addressed, and that does not leave time or money for solving OTHER countries' problems." The way in which this general notion has been expressed by Trump and other MAGA politicians, in the last 10 years, is "America First!"
    
    Well, Trump clearly isn't an "America First!" isolationist anymore. And while there are certainly many MAGA types, including many who have previously identified as staunch isolationists, who are twisting themselves into knots to make all of this OK, there are other MAGA types who are already expressing their discontent. That includes Marjorie Taylor Greene (who is officially no longer a representative), Candace Owens and Steve Bannon, among others. Yes, Greene is an apostate these days, but the others aren't. And again, since military conflicts get more unpopular over time, the isolationist MAGA wing is likely to grow larger and louder. Jen Golbeck, who writes the blog MAGA Report, has a similar sense of things.
    
    Please be clear, we are not proposing that the invasion of Venezuela is the beginning of the end for Trump/MAGA. It may be another couple dozen of those thousand cuts we've talked about, and it may give some MAGA an offramp, if they've been looking for an excuse to turn apostate anyhow. But the only thing we are really proposing here is that this is not going to have the effect that so many Trump policies do, of firing up MAGA while alienating most everyone else. No, it looks like Venezuela will only do the second part of that.
    
    
11. Vance Can't Dance: We have already noted that if there's anyone in the administration who's been put on the hot seat by this invasion, it's VP J.D. Vance. He's a leading member of the GOP's isolationist wing, and if he suddenly discovers he's actually an interventionist, it will further burnish his already-well-established reputation as a chameleon who doesn't actually stand for anything at all. On the other hand, if he doesn't toe the White House line, then he becomes Mike Pence v2.0, and his presidential hopes are dead in the water.
    
    Vance has been MIA at the various major photo-ops, including the original invasion-watching party. However, his silence had become deafening, and so he felt the need to get on X and issue a "statement." In it, he tries to walk the fine line he's trying to walk by framing this as a law enforcement action, rather than a military action, and then coupling that with a little Trump a**-kissing:

    The president offered multiple off ramps, but was very clear throughout this process: the drug trafficking must stop, and the stolen oil must be returned to the United States. Maduro is the newest person to find out that President Trump means what he says.

    We've already written that the evidence Maduro was engaging in drug trafficking is shaky; even the current (Trump-appointed) intelligence apparatus concluded as much. Meanwhile, the notion that Venezuela "stole" oil that is under the ground in Venezuela is quite the hubris. As we note above, much American oil infrastructure was nationalized 20 years ago, but Vance and other right-wingers have elided that into "the Venezuelans stole OUR oil." That is ridiculous, and we don't believe for a moment that Vance actually believes that. So, it's another case of him coming off as phony.
    
    Incidentally, "President Trump means what he says" is clearly a talking point that is being pushed by the White House, or maybe by the RNC, right now. And we've seen/heard a number of reasonable and non-MAGA people in the past few days who said, in so many words, "You know, you gotta admit, he DOES mean what he says." We would like to remind readers that is most certainly not the case. Sure, Trump sometimes says some pretty impolitic things, and he means them. And sometimes he says some very militaristic and/or jingoistic things, and he means them. But he didn't mean it when he said he had a plan to replace Obamacare. Or that he would release his tax returns. Or that he would only hire the best people. And even when he DOES mean something, there's a better than even chance he'll change his mind, sooner or later. There's a reason that "TACO" is a thing.
    
    
12. The Good News for Trump?: We dislike the excessive amount of certainty in "There's no way this works out well for Trump, politically." We think the overwhelming weight of the evidence points in that direction, but there are no certainties in the world of politics. So, while writing the item this weekend, we wracked our brains: "What is a plausible theory for how maybe, just maybe, this works out well for the administration, politically?"
    
    We couldn't come up with anything then, but we've got something now. Analysts think that gas prices this year will be the lowest they've been in any year since the pandemic. This will actually be despite the Venezuela mess, not because of it. Nonetheless, some people are going to assume the two things are related.
    
    Meanwhile, oil stocks have shot up in trading since the attack. That is most definitely due to Venezuela, as many investors are buying into the Trump rhetoric that there's black gold at the end of this particular rainbow. As we note above, that's likely untrue, but it's not the first time that stock speculators have ignored reality.
    
    Anyhow, if the Venezuela invasion has, or appears to have, positive economic effects, and if the negative effects do not become apparent until 2027 or 2028 then, just maybe, this will work out to the benefit of the White House and of the Republican Party heading into the 2026 midterms. It's a pretty thin theory and, again, we don't think the evidence points this way. But we're a full-service political analysis site, and we try to give some attention to all possible outcomes.

That's the latest. We planned to run reader letters on this subject today, but we don't want to overdo it on Venezuela content, or on word count, so we'll hold that for tomorrow.

Also, our thanks to the several readers who provided useful tips for this item, among them J.L.K. in Los Angeles, CA, D.R. in Oakland, CA, and K.H. in Albuquerque, NM. (Z)