
Something like half a dozen red states are already busy with midterm redistricting. This could net the Republicans around 7-8 House seats on the assumption that California is able to flip five seats from red to blue. Otherwise, it will be worse. In addition, the Supreme Court seems poised to tell states in the South that they are free to eliminate all their majority-minority districts; that could add up to as many as 10-12 flipped seats. Democratic states are not being nearly as aggressive, in part due to their own Constitutions and in part because they don't like playing hardball. So is it hopeless for the blue team?
Veteran political analyst Charlie Cook is not so sure. He notes that there is less volatility in approval ratings now than 20 or 30 years ago. George H.W. Bush was at 89% approval after driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait but dropped to 25% when a recession hit and lost reelection due to that. His son went from 90% approval in the aftermath of 9/11, to also dropping to 25% when New Orleans was drowning in Hurricane Katrina and he was out in sunny Arizona attending John McCain's birthday party. Ronald Reagan's range was 35-68%. Bill Clinton's was 37-73%. Barack Obama's was 38-69%.
It is not like that anymore. Partisanship trumps everything now. A president's core supporters will not leave him, no matter what happens. Nor will his opponents give him credit for anything. This means a president's range is now quite narrow. And the president's approval rating has a big effect on House results. Trump is now in the low 40s and is not likely to get much higher in the coming year.
However, one-third of the country consists of (nominal) independents. They can be all-in for the president or all-in against him. That still matters. Many of them voted for Donald Trump because they thought Joe Biden was too old and Kamala Harris was too Black and too female. For them, the past 9 months is not the cruise they signed up for.
In first-past-the-post races, small swings can have amplified effects. In presidential politics, there are currently seven swing states: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. In 2016, Trump won them by 3.54%, 5.13%, 0.23%, -2.42% (i.e., Trump lost Nevada), 3.66%, 0.72%, and 0.77%, respectively. In 2020, Joe Biden won them by 0.30%, 0.23%, 2.78%, 2.39%, -1.34% (i.e., Biden lost North Carolina), 0.16%, and 0.63%, respectively. In 2024, Trump won them by 5.53%, 2.19%, 1.42%, 3.10%, 3.21%, 1.71%, and 0.86%, respectively. If we just add up the seven numbers for each year and divide by seven, we get 1.66%, 0.76%, and 2.57%, respectively. A swing of 3-5% means all the world here. With independents now against Trump 2:1, there could well be a 5-point swing.
Currently, before the midterm gerrymandering started, there were 98 districts in the range R+5 to D+5, inclusive. All of these could conceivably go either way in a big-wave election. History shows that when there is a wave, a majority of the swing districts go the same way. They are not really independent, just as the swing states weren't independent in 2016, 2020, and 2024. When a party has the momentum, it has it (almost) everywhere. If the Republicans net 10 seats by gerrymandering, their 220-215 margin becomes 230-205. That means if they lose a net 13 seats in the 90+ swing districts, they lose the House.
Suppose after all the gerrymandering is done, there are 90 swing districts left (and remember, gerrymandering may create swing districts in the South when Black Democrats are stuffed into previously safe red districts, changing them from deep red to pink). If the Democrats can win 52 of the 90 swing districts, that is enough to control the House. 52/90 is 58%, which is a lot, but not impossible in a wave election. Remember that Democrats flipped 41 seats in the 2018 midterms when the economy was good. It is not as good now and could get worse. This is why Cook is skeptical that the Republicans can hold the House. (V)