Dem 47
image description
   
GOP 53
image description

Saturday Q&A

If you're still working on the headline theme, we'll tell you that it's SMOOOOOOOOOOOKIN!.

The various sections in the Q&A don't usually have a unifying theme, but today, "Politics" and "Gallimaufry" clearly do. You could also say the same for "Current Events," maybe.

Current Events

S.S. in West Hollywood, CA, asks: Where does the Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) fall on a list of the worst foreign policy blunders in American history?

(Z) answers: To guide my thinking on this question, I started by coming up with my list of the five worst non-MOU foreign policy mistakes in American history, with #1 being the worst:

  1. Aiding in the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh (1953)
  2. Mishandling the Treaty of Versailles (1919)
  3. Aiding the White Russians during the Russian Revolution (1918)
  4. The invasion of Iraq (2003)
  5. Escalating the Vietnam War into a full-fledged conflict (1964-65)

Then, I found a list of America's worst foreign policy mistakes put together by the Council on Foreign Relations:

  1. Bombing of Nagasaki (1945)
  2. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964)
  3. Limits on Jewish Refugees From Germany (1939)
  4. Withdrawal From the Paris Agreement (2017)
  5. Forcible Removal of the Cherokee Nation (1838)
  6. Senate Rejection of the Treaty of Versailles (1919)
  7. Support for the Overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1953)
  8. Indian Removal Act (1830)
  9. Deployment of Combat Forces to Vietnam (1965)
  10. The Invasion of Iraq (2003)

There's obviously pretty substantial overlap between the two lists, though CFR clearly doesn't think the intervention in the Russian Revolution mattered, while I obviously don't think that Indian policy counts as "foreign policy."

Anyhow, the only way you can rank the MOU #1 is if you're judging based on how foolish it is "in the moment." By that, I mean that most of these foreign policy mistakes only became clear-cut blunders with the benefit of hindsight. In the moment, there were certainly plenty of people who thought the right choice was being made, for various reasons. The only real exception to that, on either list, is the Paris Agreement withdrawal. Not coincidentally, also the work of Donald Trump. As we have pointed out this week, there is no serious analyst (that we can find) who thinks the MOU, as currently constituted, is a good idea for the U.S.

If you consider blunders based on negative long-term impact, then you can't put the MOU #1 because we just don't know what will happen. Vietnam and Iraq were both very bad, killed hundreds of thousands of people, led to torture and war crimes, destabilized American society and the world economy, and did all sorts of other harms. Clearly, the MOU hasn't done that yet.

The worst-case scenario for the MOU probably looks something like this: Empowered by the near-total lack of meaningful controls on its nuclear power, and awash in a sea of cash, Iran becomes a full-fledged nuclear power. Then, based on some provocation in the future, they lob a nuke or six in the direction of Israel. Israel responds in kind, it becomes a brutal regional conflict, and then becomes a worldwide nuclear conflict. Tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, are left dead.

The best-case scenario for the MOU probably looks something like this: The events of the Iran War, followed by Iran using its control over the Strait of Hormuz to extract maximum cash from the rest of the world, causes everyone to get serious about the post-petroleum economy. There is massive and successful investment in much greener technologies, helping significantly to reduce climate change, while also eventually leaving Iran as rogue state without meaningful power, something along the lines of North Korea. Eventually the Iranian people rise up, overthrow the regime, and re-establish the liberal democracy they had in the 1950s before the U.S. started mucking around in their affairs.

It is not likely that either of these extreme outcomes will come to pass. However, this does speak to the broad range of possibilities. And until we know, we just can't tell how bad the MOU really is.



L.B. in Savannah, GA, asks: We're talking close to a third of a TRILLION dollars to rebuild Iran. Where is that money supposed to come from? Others have pointed out the difference between the hysteria over Obama returning a much smaller amount of the Iranians' own money, and the comparative lack of concern over this figure.

It seems like we should be getting a lot more in return for a sum of this magnitude. How about regime change by writing a check for a few million bucks to every member of the current government and IRGC in return for their retirement? Iran joins the Abraham Accords? They don't just promise to stop enriching uranium; they hand over all of their enriched uranium, dismantle the facilities for producing it, and get rid of their drones and ballistic missiles, too? Did anyone even ask?

Also, doesn't Congress have to authorize this? Surely there are more than a few Republicans who don't want to go into the midterms facing ads from Democrats saying "the reason you can't have free health care/college/gas is because the Republicans gave all of our money to Iran." $300 billion is around what the U.S. has given to Israel over the past 50 years, and we know how people feel about that, even though most of it was spent back here.

Please explain how this will work. Or is this just Trump making yet another meaningless promise?

(Z) answers: The administration is deliberately obfuscating on this point. There are rumors of secret agreements that have not been made public, but who knows how true that is, or how specific those agreements might be, if they do exist.

In the absence of any real details, we are left only with past behavior from this administration to work with. And what Trump & Co. have done many times is engage in magic bookkeeping that basically makes normal commerce look like "new" expenditures and "achievements" for the President. To give a specific possibility, it looks like the White House intends to lift all sanctions on Iranian oil. If so, it is estimated that Iran can realize $60 billion/year in oil sales. And you know what that adds up to after 5 years? $300 billion.



D.E. in Lancaster, PA, asks: In Trump's Memo of Understanding, there is a provision that makes it sound like the Arab states in the region will help contribute $300 billion to the reconstruction of Iran. These countries would presumably be Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. I've listen to a bit of criticism about this so-called deal but so far have not heard a single person address this matter. What will all these predominantly Sunni countries feel about rebuilding the predominantly Shia country of Iran? Given that this a centuries-old dispute between these two sects, and that Saudia Arabia's Royal Family has based their holding onto power on ultra-conservative Wahhabism that views the Shia with deep hostility and contempt?

When George W. Bush blundered into Iraq, they downplayed the tensions and hostilities between the Sunni and the Shia and the result was a civil war. And let's not forget that the last time the Saudis thought the U.S. was meddling in their affairs, members of the Saudi royal family funded Osama bin-Laden's al-Qaeda and 19 of their citizens flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Your thoughts?

(Z) answers: Assuming that Trump is not planning on magic bookkeeping (see above), then you are absolutely right. Trump is never going to be able to get Congress/Americans to give Iran $300 billion (or any substantial portion of that sum). He's not going to be able to get Sunni countries to hand over piles of cash to a nation they regard as an enemy (the Saudis, in particular, loathe Iran). He's not going to be able to get the allies to give money; they were not consulted on this war, and they want no part of it. And he's certainly not going to be able to get China to give money. And with all of those possibilities off the list, there really aren't any other places where you're going to find $300 billion.



J.M. in Minneapolis, MN, asks: I share your dismay (and that of virtually every other enlightened, conscientious politics and foreign affairs observer) over the U.S. capitulation to Iran in the MOU. Whether or not this just TACO surrender or an elaborate effort designed to transfer blame to J.D. Vance (or do something else), it is hard not to see it as a turning point, and possibly THE definitive turning point in the decline of US global power.

That being said, two questions come to mind. First, Trump's reputation for not paying contractors and reneging on promises precedes him. Surely Iranian leadership understands that. Is there any reason to believe this MOU actually resolves anything in the conflict?

Second, why would Trump even offer such a concession if motivated mainly by the midterm elections? We have seen multiple cycles now of systematic underperformance of Democrats, and they seem unable to unify around a message with broad appeal and overcome their brand problems. Even if they took one or both chambers of Congress, Republican intransigence has reached such extremes that I am not confident Democrats would accomplish anything in the next Congress (and then they'd be punished again for it in 2028). Why make such a reckless bet so early when Republicans have generally done well sustaining their numbers and managed much better to deflect accountability and have voters believe them? Are they really that worried by what would happen if Democrats did take Congress?

(Z) answers: In 1939, the Nazis and the Soviets signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in which they agreed not to attack each other. Neither really intended to honor the agreement; Adolf Hitler just needed time to subjugate France and Joseph Stalin just needed time to build up his military.

I don't think Iran really believes Trump will live up to his promises; they just want some time to clean up the most damaged parts of their country, and to re-fill their coffers by selling some oil (or charging tolls on others' oil). I don't know what Trump thinks, because he is a master of self-delusion, but the people around him must be extremely skeptical that Iran will live up to their promises. I suspect that the thinking of a Marco Rubio or a Pete Hegseth is that the administration will get past the midterms, and then will have something like 2 years where it can do what it wants without having to worry about voters.

As to Trump worrying about the Democrats, he DOES NOT play 3-D chess. In his mind, the Democrats are the enemy, and if they do well, he is not happy. End of story. That said, he's probably not wrong here. It is true that if the Democrats control one or both chambers of Congress, but not the White House, they can't do much in terms of legislation. But they can conduct investigations, and force Trump to issue unpopular vetoes, and refuse to confirm his problematic nominees, and hold up the budget, and resist him in other ways. And I think that will quench the thirst of many voters in a way that would not normally be the case. Meanwhile, if the Democrats pass a bunch of popular bills that Trump vetoes, they can say, "Hey, voters, you know what we want to do. But to get it done, we need to keep Congress AND get the White House." If Democrats capture both the House and the Senate, there will be actual trials following each of his impeachments, with witnesses, evidence or corruption, and more. He does not want that.



M.M. in El Paso, TX, asks: You gave the responses of several right-wing commentators to the Iran deal, but said that no one could be found that supported the deal. I refuse to watch Fox, but I am curious how Trump Bro (suck up, bootlicker, etc.) Sean Hannity is spinning this one. I expect contortions rivalling Olga Korbut bent over and looking forward through her feet slung over her back.

(Z) answers: Just to be clear, we specified that we could not find serious, non-partisan experts who saw silver limings in the deal. We did not make that claim about right-wingers, since some of them will apologize for Trump no matter what.

That said, you are right in thinking that the case of Hannity is probably instructive. The Fox entertainer has not criticized the MOU, but he has declared that it's really not worth talking about, because that's not what the final agreement will actually look like. We believe that is known as "damning with faint praise."



J.S. in Durham, NC, asks: I have never heard of a peace deal, even a preliminary one, referred to as a "Memorandum of Understanding." Are there other examples of this? If not, what made them use this construct?

(Z) answers: By and large, wars end with two types of documents. The first type is some sort of broad, preliminary agreement, often called an armistice. The other is a legally binding document that formally ends hostilities, which is always called a treaty. Some wars have both (World War I), some end with only a treaty (War of 1812), some end with an armistice and never proceed to the formal treaty stage (Korean War).

"Memorandum of Understanding" is really just a different way of saying "armistice." I can think of two reasons that terminology might have been used here. First, MOUs are generally more of a business thing than a diplomacy thing. So, maybe Trump's people thought he would understand "Memorandum of Understanding" better, conceptually, than he would understand "armistice," even if they're the same thing.

Second, a treaty is definitely a treaty. A "Memorandum of Understanding," maybe not. So, there is more opportunity with an MOU to do an end-run around the Senate and its power to approve treaties. This is not unheard of; Richard Nixon reached a couple of agreements with the Soviets that were memoranda of understanding, such as the "Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems on May 26, 1972."



R.L.D. in Sundance, WY, asks: I've noticed recently that Sundance has the lowest gas prices for at least an 80-mile radius. And they started dropping here before they did in other surrounding cities. As of yesterday, we are paying $3.799, which is down about 5 cents from last week, and a couple weeks before that it was a drop of more than 15 cents/gallon. I thought maybe Wyoming had instituted a gas tax holiday or something, since prices in South Dakota (just a few minutes away) were not dropping, but the surrounding Wyoming cities are seeing smaller drops and lagging behind where Sundance is.

My inner conspiracist says that oil companies were price gouging and have decided, or were pressured, to lower prices for a bit to maintain market share or relationships with GOP leadership, but he doesn't have much credibility. I guess, according to Google, oil prices on the world market are falling somewhat despite decided lack of progress on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, but that just pushes the question back a layer or two. So, my question is, What's up with gas prices? Or rather, What's down with gas prices?

(Z) answers: There is absolutely no doubt that petroleum producers, shielded from customer anger by virtue of the Iran War getting the blame, have been padding their prices. I've read a dozen articles on this subject, and the general consensus is that the padding is in the realm of 50 cents/gallon.

If Big Oil keeps prices too high for too long, they risk doing long-term damage to their business. So, they have some motivation to drop prices right now.



J.H. in Durham, NC, asks: I had a question about the leaked letter from Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC). Do you have any guesses about the motivation of the leaker(s)? In particular, do you think it was likely to have been leaked from a "normie" Republican angry at Trump/Tuberville, a MAGA Republican angry at Tillis, or even some Republican staffer jaded enough with their party that they wanted to encourage cracks forming?

(Z) answers: I don't see any compelling reason that someone would want to undermine Tillis. He's a short-timer who will be out of office in about 6 months.

I have no information, but I think it's likely that Tillis (or his staff) leaked the letter. After all, whatever he hoped to achieve, his message is amplified if it goes public. The next most likely candidate is Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), who benefits a great deal from Mainers thinking she is holding the line on certain issues, even if it means "standing up" to her party. Though note that, as per usual, the "standing up" does not actually require Collins to cast a decisive vote against the GOP.



V.B. in Chicago, IL, asks: In you Thom Tillis write-up, there was frequent reference to something called "privilege." What is that?

(Z) answers: A privileged bill or motion is one that is not subject to the usual rules of the House and/or the Senate. In this particular case, Tillis was using "privileged" to mean "non-filibusterable."



J.I. in San Francisco, CA, asks: Although the nomination for would-be DNI Jay Clayton was withdrawn, couldn't the Senate just ignore that and go with the original nomination anyway? There's nothing in the Constitution that says the Senate has to pay attention to a withdrawn nomination; Clayton was nominated already, and that's all the Constitution says is necessary before the Senate applies their "advice and consent."

Of course. this would be very strange and break precedent, and even if confirmed Trump could just fire Clayton, or Clayton himself could just resign. But, the Senate could turn around and approve him again; there's nothing in the Constitution that says how long the nomination is good for, either. I suppose they could even re-confirm Tulsi Gabbard, or heck, why not someone from a previous administration?

Yeah, it's really silly, but maybe the Senate could propose legislation to prevent senators from pulling these antics, in return for, you know, not having just some random guy be installed as acting DNI.

(Z) answers: As you point out, this kind of chicanery could lead to a ridiculous circus of confirmed-fired-confirmed-fired and so on and so forth. The Senate's time is valuable, and can't be wasted on such silliness.

But I also think there is something more important. A president really has to be able to clearly implement their intent, and to change their mind, when it comes to "this is my nominee" and "this is NOT my nominee." Imagine that someone gets nominated by a president of one party, proves to be problematic, and is approved by a Senate controlled by the other party, just to embarrass the president. That is obviously a complete perversion of the process.

There's an even worse scenario. Imagine that, when Ruth Bader Ginsburg died, then-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) had someone go through Barack Obama's old speeches, writings and lectures, and found an occasion where the President said something mildly positive about some right-wing judge. Then, McConnell declares that is tantamount to "nominating" the judge, and moves forward with confirmation. Is it really impossible that McConnell would try such a stunt, if he thought it would work? And judges, unlike executive branch employees, do not serve at the pleasure of the president, and cannot be fired.

Politics

J.I. in Hicksville, NY, asks: According to reports, the MOU with Iran was signed by both donald Trump and J.D. Vance. Does the VP normally sign things like this?

(Z) answers: It is virtually unheard of. In fact, I can't recall another example that parallels this one, since the VP has no role in foreign affairs. There are only two reasons I can think of for such a stunt: (1) to let the VP share in the glory, and to help set him up for a future presidential run, or (2) to set the VP up to take the fall. I certainly know which one I think is the case here.



J.O. in Omaha, NE, asks: Let's imagine that Donald Trump actually does throw J.D. Vance to the wolves in an attempt to distance himself from the concessions he made to Iran. I don't think it's outside the realm of possibility for Trump to ask Vance to accept the blame and resign. If Vance were to refuse, I suspect Republicans in Congress would follow orders to impeach him (a scapegoat helps them shift blame too), but what do you think Democrats would do?

(Z) answers: Impeaching Vance, when he had committed no high crimes or misdemeanors, would be a gross violation of the Constitution. I don't think Democrats would play along, and I think many Republicans would rebel, too.

The only way I can imagine the Democrats helping Trump out is if they recapture the House, and conclude that it would be pretty good to have (presumably) Speaker of the House Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) second in the line of succession, given Trump's age and health. In that case, the Democrats would have to also refuse to approve a new VP, thus keeping the office vacant. I really don't think the blue team is willing to play this kind of hardball, especially since Jeffries would be accused of stealing the presidency if he did succeed to the office. But it's at least possible.



R.B. in Cleveland, OH, asks: Since history rhymes, what are the odds J.D. Vance is forced to resign as VP in October (à la Spiro Agnew) as a consequence for Iran, but really to mitigate the midterm results?

(Z) answers: Vance is not going to resign. He thinks he is going to be president one day, and that being VP is key to that.



W.F. in Chambersburg, PA, asks: If the cognitive dissonance were to suddenly vanish in the mind of J.D. Vance, if he were to realize that he is Trump's public scapegoat for the debacle with Iran, and he has no chance at becoming POTUS—could Vance immediately expose the lies and corruption of Trump administration without being fired or sent to a cell in Guantanamo Bay?

(Z) answers: Well, he can't be fired. And imprisoning him in Gitmo, without his having been convicted of a crime, would be very illegal and very scandalous. That might actually be enough to get Trump impeached and convicted.

Vance is not going to turn apostate, because again, he thinks he is going to be president one day on the MAGA ticket. And even if he does turn apostate, it won't matter. MAGA will regard him as a traitor, and everyone else already knows what's going on. Consider Mike Pence, who likewise continued to delude himself that he could one day be president, and whose apostasy in the months and years after 1/6 has had virtually no impact.



D.G. in Webster Groves, MO, asks: Do you really think Secretary of State Marco Rubio can escape the stench of the MOU? Maybe he wasn't involved, but how does he respond when somebody points out that he has one job, to promote the United States' interest in its relationships with other countries?

(Z) answers: Undoubtedly, this is a question that keeps Rubio up at night right now. However, I think it's actually pretty irrelevant. Whether he can escape the stench of any particular misstep of the Trump administration, he can't escape the overall stench. And barring some shocking development, I cannot see how anyone closely identified with Trump can be electable in 2028. Let's not forget that, after the disastrous Trump v1.0, even Trump himself was not electable. And MAGA loves, loves, loves him (while they regard both Rubio and J.D. Vance with much skepticism).

Civics

B.H. in St. Paul, MN, asks: You wrote:

Mayor, Washington, DC: The District has ranked-choice voting, so it could be a little while before we know the result of the Democratic primary (which is the de facto election, in D+44 DC).

Some version of this sentence shows up whenever Electoral-Vote.com covers an election that uses ranked-choice voting, and I've never understood why—and living in St. Paul, I know that it does. Why is that?

(Z) answers: First, because you cannot produce results until you've got all ballots. Some places, like California, have liberal rules for all ballots sent by mail. And pretty much all places have liberal rules for military ballots. Obviously, the ballots in hand can be processed, but nothing can be finalized until all ballots are in.

Beyond that, processing ranked-choice takes a lot of time, and has to be double- and sometimes triple-checked to make sure no errors were made. Much harder than processing single-candidate-style ballots.



J.S. in Durham, NC, asks: I continue to be confused about the difference between "neoconservatism" and "neoliberalism." I have looked at these definitions multiple times and it seems to me that they are both very conservative. Some extremely so. However, I cannot wrap my head around why a political philosophy that is so right-wing is called any type of liberalism. I imagine that there is some sort of political or historical context that might enlighten me. Please help.

(Z) answers: There isn't much difference, except that neoconservatives tend to be war hawks, while neoliberals tend to be isolationist.

The term "neoliberal" has very little to do with the term "liberal" as it is used in politics today. Neoliberals are "classic" liberals, which means that they are essentially the opposite of monarchists. So, they favor reduced government power (as opposed to absolute power), freedom of trade (as opposed to mercantilism or other state-centered systems), encouragement of private economic concerns (as opposed to state-operated or state-supervised concerns) and limited regulation (as opposed to strong government oversight). In the context of American politics, the term that comes closest to being a synonym for "neoliberal" is actually "libertarian" and not "liberal."



P.M. in Reading, England, UK, asks: Thinking back to John Adams and Thomas Jefferson dying on the same day: Is there protocol for what happens with two presidents dying on the same day or close to the same day? Who gets priority for the lying in state, funerals, etc.? I assume a sitting president would get priority, but what about former presidents? Is it based on when they were president, or something else?

(Z) answers: To start, the deaths of Jefferson and Adams were not handled the way they would be today. Travel times were long, and the ability to preserve dead bodies (particularly in the heat of summer) was limited. So, while their passings were national news, there was no laying in state in the Capitol or anything like that.

Now that we are in an era where extended commemoration, and long-distance transport of a dead body, are possible, the situation is a little different. There isn't exactly an established protocol, though the White House Office of Protocol does work with presidents to develop a funerary plan for whenever that president goes the way of all men. Beyond that, if multiple presidents were to die in close proximity, then the powers that be would improvise on the fly as best as possible, in line with the wishes of the deceased presidents and their families.

Far and away the most significant case of a real challenge on this front came in just under a month in 1972-73. In the span of 25 days, Harry S. Truman died (December 26, 1972), Richard Nixon was re-inaugurated (January 20, 1973) and Lyndon B. Johnson died (January 22, 1973). A lot of government employees pulled a lot of overtime in those 25 days, but they managed to handle all three events appropriately without having to cut corners.



M.M. in San Diego, CA, asks: Regarding the AI-generated takedown ad of James Talarico, is there a legal argument that his image has been appropriated, that it was used without his consent and without renumeration? Looking for a different approach than suing for defamation.

(Z) answers: Doubtful. The basis for a suit of the sort that you describe is that a person is entitled to their "right of publicity," which means you can't make a commercial in which you say, or imply, without Talarico's consent, that he wants you to vote for Donald Trump, or that he wants you to buy Coca-Cola, or that he thinks you should skip vaccines, or whatever.

Obviously, the AI ad was not trying to convince people that Talarico endorsed something he did not actually endorse. And if he tried to sue, on whatever basis, then the people who made the ad would argue it was satire protected by the First Amendment.

History

L.S. in Black Mountain, NC, asks: Sometime, somewhere I read something to the effect that great civilizations/empires typically last about 250 years on average. Are you familiar with this metric, and is it accurate in your view? If so, the U.S. better get its act together if we expect to be the exception to the rule.

(Z) answers: This is the notion of someone who has noticed that the U.S. is approaching its 250th birthday, and appears to be in decline, and has endeavored to generalize to most or all of world history. Presumably the point is to motivate Americans to, if I may borrow your words, get their acts together. It is, to be blunt, nonsense.

To start with, the periodization doesn't even work for the United States. America, as a country, has only existed for 250 years, but American civilization has existed for something like 400 years. On the other end of the equation, America, as a country, has existed for 250 years, but it's only been an empire/world power for maybe 125 years of that.

And then you think of other great civilizations/empires, and it REALLY falls apart. Chinese civilization has existed for 5,000 years. The Persian and Egyptian civilizations, nearly as long. Same for Indian civilization, several Native American civilizations, Polynesian civilization, Italian and Japanese civilization. The modern version of French civilization is 1,600 years old, Spanish civilization is not far behind that, and modern English civilization is 1,000+ years old. As to empires, the Chinese have had multiple empires that lasted at least 500 years (i.e., double 250 years), and the Romans, the Persians, the Ottomans, the Malians, the Aztecs, the Holy Romans, the Venetians, the Egyptians, and the Babylonians, among others also reached the 500-plus-years mark.

Indeed, it's kind of hard to think of a country or an empire that lasted 250 (or so) years. Usually, if a country is stable, it lasts much longer than that. And if it's not stable, it falls much sooner (think the U.S.S.R., or Yugoslavia, or Zaire). As to empires, they tend to linger for the lifetime of the person who created them (Charlemagne, Alexander the Great, Napoleon) or to last for many centuries (the examples above, along with numerous prominent four-century empires like Spain and Britain).



J.F. in Ft. Worth, TX, asks: I fondly remember celebrating the Bicentennial in 1976 as a young kid. This year's celebrations have been a real dud so far. Were there big celebrations in 1826 and 1926, and if so, what did they call them?

(Z) answers: There was a modest commemoration of the Declaration in Washington in 1826.

Thereafter, the preferred format for such celebrations were expositions—big county-fair-type events with lots of booths and exhibits and attendees. There was a centennial exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876, known formally as "The International Exhibition of Arts, Manufactures, and Products of the Soil and Mine," which attracted 10 million attendees. There was another event in 1926, also in Philadelphia, which had the official name "Sesqui-Centennial International Exposition" and drew about 6 million attendees. The largest of these events was not on the anniversary of the Declaration, however. It was the World's Columbian Exposition, which ostensibly honored the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' voyage, and which was actually meant to show off how awesome America had become. That one sold nearly 30 million tickets.

The United States' celebration of the bicentennial was, obviously, not a giant fair or exposition. In fact, it basically mimicked the celebration of the Civil War centennial (1861-65), which was built around a bunch of state-level commissions, educational materials, tacky merchandise and historical pageantry.



M.G. in Boulder, CO, asks: For my graduate-level history class many years ago, I was assigned a book about William McKinley and came away with the impression that his administration did little but prepare for his second term, which ended too soon to accomplish what was planned. Clearly, I was assigned the wrong book on this president. What would be a better current choice?

(Z) answers: Well, there is a biography of McKinley that won the Pulitzer Prize. That is In the Days of McKinley (1959) by Margaret Leech. However, it is out of print (so definitely not current) and, as its title implies, it's not so much about McKinley as it is about the times in which he lived.

Often, including on this site, I recommend the American Presidents series, edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. The whole point is to give the basics of the president's life, career and impact in 200 pages or so. The McKinley volume (2003) in that series was written by Kevin P. Phillips, who pretty famously went from being a hardcore Republican (in the 1960s) to being a hardcore anti-Republican (in the 1990s).

If you want something a bit more in-depth, and a bit more recent, President McKinley: Architect of the American Century (2018), by Robert W. Merry, approaches the subject in the manner you asked about.



A.G. in Scranton, PA, asks: Last week, I asked if Donald Trump was hated more or less by liberals (and others) than President Lincoln was by Southerners during and before the Civil War.

What if we flipped the party affiliation and asked the same question about conservatives' hatred for Joe Biden, Barack Obama, or perhaps even a common person who chose his/her different pronouns?

(Z) answers: What you have to understand is that antebellum Southern society was essentially feudalism. That isn't a controversial statement; pre-war Southerers embraced a medieval aesthetic, including suits of armor as decor, their favorite author being Sir Walter Scott, etc.

What this means is that Southern society was rigidly structured and ordered, that it was an honor-shame culture, that people saw things in very black and white terms (both literally and figuratively) and that they were very comfortable with violence as a solution to problems.

There is nothing in modern America that is especially comparable, at least not on a large scale. So, for any formulation of "Did this [modern faction] hate this [modern politician] as much as Southerners hated Lincoln?" the answer is always going to be "no." The closest modern approximation I can offer in terms of the way Southerners hated Lincoln is to think about the way Iranians hate Donald Trump.



J.M. in New Glasgow, NS, Canada, asks: Your answer to a question about who is more hated by their opponents between Trump and Lincoln, and your overwhelming answer of Lincoln, got me thinking. I recall reading a few years back on this site that Lincoln said: "I cannot bring myself to believe that any human being lives who would do me any harm."

Given your answer about half the white population of an entire region wanting to kill him, was Lincoln naive, ignorant, or something else?

(Z) answers: Lincoln had a strong sense of fatalism and indulged in a fair bit of denial. He got threats against his life on a regular basis, and even kept a folder full of them on his desk. The Secret Service was 40 or so years in the future, and the insights needed for proper presidential security were even further away than that. Lincoln did not carry arms on his person, and even if he had, self-defense would have been difficult.

So, Lincoln coped with some amount of "Nobody would actually want to hurt me" and some amount of "Well, if someone does want to hurt me, there's not much I can do to prevent it."

Gallimaufry

F.S. in Cologne, Germany, asks: Are you personally interested in the FIFA World Cup 2026? If yes, how do you like it so far, and which nation will win this year, in your opinion?

(Z) answers: Of the four of us, I am the most interested, by a fair margin. I catch about one game a day, and I have seen both U.S. games and both Mexico games. It's been very good so far, with the caveat that I don't have a deep understanding of the sport the way I do with, say, gridiron football or baseball, so I don't really grasp the subtleties and nuances of strategy.

And my money is on England to win.



R.C. in Des Moines, IA, asks: If the U.S. men's national soccer team surprises everyone (but themselves?) and wins this World Cup, would that constitute a bigger surprise than the U.S. men's hockey team winning gold in 1980?

(Z) answers: Without question. First of all, in 1980, the U.S. was certainly one of the five or six greatest hockey powers in the world (behind the U.S.S.R. and Canada, but about on a level with Finland, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia). By contrast, the American national soccer team is currently at #13 in the FIFA worldwide rankings.

Second, the betting odds on the U.S. men's hockey team in 1980 ranged from +350 to +1000, depending on when you placed your bet, and which book you did business with. At the moment, the betting odds on the U.S. men's soccer team are +4000. If you would like those translated, it means the books gave the U.S. a roughly 10%-20% chance to win gold in hockey in 1980, whereas they are giving the U.S. a 5% chance to win the Cup this year.



I.J. in Rockville, MD, asks: Impulsively bought tickets to the Netherlands-Sweden game for today in Houston. This was partly inspired by the fans dancing and following the orange bus for their first game against Japan, partly inspired because my half-brothers are Dutch and are crazy about soccer. I was reading about the soccer dance, "Links Rechts." It looks like the song came out in 2015, but my father said his first wife and a bunch of Dutch fans were jumping around like that many years ago when he was watching the game with them in Washington, DC (we are talking the 1980's). Has the left-right dance been around before the song came out? What is the origin story of the Oranje fan march/dance? Excited to read your answer before the Oranje fan walk Saturday morning in Houston!

(Z) answers: Actually, you want the sports guy, not the Netherlands guy. The left-right dance (i.e., links-rechts) that Dutch soccer fans are known for began to emerge in the 1970s. The song just glommed onto an existing phenomenon, which is exactly what it was written to do.



P.S. in Atlanta, GA, asks: I, for one, have been touched to see the interactions between World Cup fans and America. Especially when it is easy to forgot the beauty, joys and delightful oddities of our nation (Buccees seems to perplex the foreign mind more than any other). There are famous precedents of sport acting as a surrogate for diplomacy. What effect, if any, do you all think the World Cup will have on the midterms and the body politic in general?

(Z) answers: I don't believe the World Cup will have an impact on the midterms. However, I don't think it's unreasonable to hope that the whole experience will serve as a form of soft diplomacy, and that many visitors will go home and spread the word that not all Americans are Donald Trump clones/supporters.



This item appeared on www.electoral-vote.com. Read it Monday through Friday for political and election news, Saturday for answers to reader's questions, and Sunday for letters from readers.

www.electoral-vote.com                     State polls                     All Senate candidates